By late Rev. Dr. Heltherington
The term itself, toleration in matters of religion, is one which has rarely been defined with the care and exactness which its great importance demands; consequently, the whole subject is liable to every sort of sophistical perversion; and very many of the controversial writings that have appeared concerning it start from different points, and run on either in parallel or in diverging lines, without the possibility of ever arriving at the same conclusion. Many thousands have been oppressed, persecuted, and put to death, for maintaining and promoting God’s revealed truth; many thousands have suffered equal extremities for maintaining and promoting satanic falsehood; and many thousands have sustained all degrees of punishment for the perpetration of immorality and crime. But who will assert that the same principle appears in all these cases? Who will say, that because it is right to suppress and punish the commission of crime, therefore it is right to suppress and punish men for asserting religious truth?
Or, that because it is wrong to suppress truth, therefore it is wrong to suppress crime, or discountenance error? But men try to escape from such reasoning, by asserting that truth cannot be ascertained with certainty; and that therefore it is best to give equal toleration to all opinions, lest a grievous mistake should be committed, and truth suppressed instead of error. This is the language of scepticism, and the principle which it promulgates is not toleration, but latitudinarian laxity and licentiousness. Such language really implies either that God did not intend to convey saving truth in a manner intelligible to the minds of men, or that He failed in His intention. But since few will be found reckless enough to maintain such opinions in their naked deformity, the advocates of sceptical laxity have recourse to every kind of evasion, in order to conceal alike the nature of the principle which they support and of that which they oppose. But, unhappily, these evasions are but too consonant to the character of the fallen mind of man, which is “enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be.” This is a truth which the sincere Christian feels and means, but which philosophers and politicians reject, despise and hate.
The essence of the inquiry is, “Has God revealed sacred saving truth to men, as the only sure guide and rule in all religious, moral and social duties?” And if this be admitted, then arises the next question—”Can this truth be so fully ascertained and known as to become a sufficient guide and rule in all such duties?” If this too should be admitted, we then arrive at the important practical inquiry—”In what manner may the knowledge of this sacred saving truth be most successfully diffused throughout the world?” For if such truth has been revealed, and can be known, man’s first duty must be to know it himself, and his next to communicate it to others. But he may err in this second point of duty, and may actually impede while he is intending to promote, its progress. Few will deny that it is the duty of every man, in his station, to encourage the extension of truth by every legitimate means within his power; but it does not at once appear so clear, whether it be also his duty to engage so actively in such a removal of opposing obstacles as would involve the direct suppression of error. And it is at this stage of the inquiry that the question of religious toleration arises in its proper form and character. For it never ought to be made a question whether truth ought to be tolerated or not—truth ought to be encouraged and diffused; but the question is, ought error also, and with equal directness, to be suppressed? The best method of obtaining a right answer to this inquiry is, to consult the Word of God, and to investigate the nature of conscience. The Word of God, in almost innumerable instances, commands the direct encouragement of truth, and also the suppression of certain forms of error—as of idolatry and blasphemy; but gives no authority to men to judge and punish errors of the mind, so far as these amount not to violations of known and equitable laws, and disturb not the peace of society. And with regard to the nature of conscience, it is manifest to every thinking man, that conscience cannot be compelled. It may be enlightened, it may be convinced, but its very nature is the free exercise of that self-judging faculty which is the essential principle of personal responsibility. Hence it is evident, that it is alike contrary to the Word of God and to the nature of conscience, for men to attempt to promote truth by the compulsive suppression of error, when that error does not obtrude itself on public view by open violation of God’s commandments and the just laws of the land. But it by no means follows that toleration means, or ought to mean, equal favour shown to error as to truth. Truth ought to be expressly favoured and encouraged: erring men ought to be treated with all tenderness and compassionate toleration; but error itself ought to be condemned, and all fair means employed for its extirpation. This could never lead to persecution, because it would constantly preserve the distinction between the abstract error and the man whose misfortune it is to be an erring man, and to whom it would show all tenderness, while it strove to rescue him from the evil consequences of those erroneous notions by which he was blinded and misled. (Extract from Dr. Hetherington’s History of the Westminster Assembly).
Note.—This article is of interest in its application to the subject-matter of the article which follows.—Editor.