Exposition of The Confession of Faith, by Robert Shaw, D.D.
(Continued from page 50)
Section III.
—The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the Kingdom of heaven, yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.
Exposition.
—In this section it was manifestly the object of the compilers of our Confession to guard equally against Erastian and sectarian principles. In opposition to Erastian principles, according to which the government and discipline of the church are devolved upon the civil magistrate, they declare that the magistrate may not take upon himself either the ministerial or judicial power in the church, in opposition to Erastians, yet, to guard against the other extreme, they assert, in opposition to the sectarians of that age, that it is his duty to employ his influence and authority, in every way competent to him, for the good of the church, and the advancement of the interests of true religion.
It is somewhat remarkable that parties holding the most opposite views, in regard to the power of the civil magistrate about religion and the connection between church and state, have concurred in representing this section of our Confession as allowing to the civil magistrate a controlling power in and over the church. The defenders of the recent interferences of the civil courts in matters strictly ecclesiastical, now homologated by the state or legislature, have appealed to this section as sanctioning these interferences. The opponents of all civil establishments of religion, on the other hand, have put the same construction on this section, and have alleged that it does allow to the civil magistrate an Erastian power in and over the church. “This, if true, would be very strange, considering that the assembly who compiled it were engaged in a dispute against this very claim with the parliament under whose protection they sat; and that, owing to their steady refusal to concede that power to the state (in which they were supported by the whole body of Presbyterians), the erection of presbyteries and synods in England was suspended.* Independently of this important fact, it would be easy to adduce numerous declarations from the Confession itself more than sufficient to repel the imputation. These declarations will come under our consideration afterwards, and at present we only remark, that the Confession must be presumed to be consistent with itself; and if some detached phrases in this section may be thought to admit of a construction unfavourable to the freedom and independence of the church, yet if these phrases are susceptible of an interpretation which harmonises with other explicit declarations respecting the independence of the church and the sole headship of Christ over it, that interpretation ought certainly to be received as their true and intended import.
Before proceeding to explain the several clauses of this section, it will be proper to offer a few general remarks. In the first place, it may be observed, that by the civil magistrate is here meant the state, or supreme civil power of the nation. In the Confession, and in theological writings in general, the civil magistrate means, not the sovereign, acting singly and exclusively, but the government of the country, or the power which is entitled to frame the national laws, and to regulate national measures. In the second place, it is unquestionable, that what the Confession here teaches respecting the duty of the civil magistrate, belongs to him as a magistrate; for it says, “He hath authority” to do what is ascribed to him. He is to discharge the duty here assigned to him, not merely by his advice and example, as a Christian placed in an exalted station, but by his official authority and influence as a magistrate. But, in the third place, it is not less evident, that our Confession here speaks of such a magistrate as is also a Christian, making a profession of the true religion. To suppose that any other than a Christian magistrate can do the things here ascribed to the magistrate, is an absurdity too gross to be imputed to the Confession. In the fourth place, our Confession here teaches that the advancement of religion, and the promotion of the interests of the church of Christ, form an important part of the official duty of Christian magistrates. Although the proper and immediate end of civil government, in subordination to God’s glory, is the temporal good of men, yet the advancement of religion is an end which civil rulers, in the exercise of their civil authority, are bound to aim at; for even this direct end of their office cannot be gained without the aids of religion. And although magistracy has its foundation in natural principles, and Christianity invests civil rulers with no new powers, yet it greatly enlarges the sphere of the operation of that power which they possess, as civil rulers, from the law of nature. That law binds the subjects of God’s moral government, jointly and severally, to embrace and reduce to practice whatsoever God is pleased to reveal as the rule of their faith and duty. And therefore nations and their rulers, when favoured with divine revelation, should give their public countenance to the true religion; remove everything out of their civil constitution inconsistent with it, or tending to retard its progress; support and protect its functionaries in the discharge of their duty; and provide, in every way competent to them, that its salutary influence have free course, and be diffused through all orders and departments of society. The compilers of our Confession had not imbibed the doctrine that the exercise of the magistrate’s authority must be limited to the secular affairs of men, and that is no part of his duty, in his official capacity, to aim at the promotion of the true religion. “Certainly,” said an eminent member of the Westminster Assembly, “there is much power and authority, which by the Word of God, and by the Confessions of Faith of the Reformed Churches, doth belong to the Christian magistrate in matters of religion.”*
But while our Confession undeniably teaches that the civil magistrate is authorised to do something about religion and the church of Christ; yet it lays certain restrictions and limitations upon the exercise of his authority in regard to these matters. According to our Confession, the civil magistrate must not assume a lordly supremacy over the church; for “there is no other head of the church but the Lord Jesus Christ,” chapter xxv, section 6. He must not interfere with her internal government; for “the Lord Jesus, as king and head of his church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church-officers, distinct from the civil magistrate”; and “to these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed,” chapter xxx, sections 1, 2. He must not, as a magistrate, sustain himself a public judge of true or false religion, so as to dictate to his subjects in matters purely religious; for “it belongeth to synods and councils ministerially to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience,” etc., chapter xxi, section 3. In the first paragraph of the section now under consideration, there is another important limitation of the power of the civil magistrate in regard to the church. It is expressly declared that he may not take upon himself the administration of her ordinances of worship: “He may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments.” Neither may he take upon himself the administration of the government and discipline of the church: “He may not assume to himself the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” The keys, in the most extensive sense, include the whole ecclesiastical power, in distinction from the sword, or the civil power.† But “power of the keys,” taken in its more limited sense, as it must be here, where it is distinguished from the administration of the Word and sacraments, just means the ordinary power of government, in the administration of the affairs of the church; and more particularly, the right of authoritatively and judicially determining all questions that may arise as to the admission of men to ordinances and to office in the Church of Christ, and the infliction and relaxation of church censures.†† This is not the only restriction laid upon the power of the civil magistrate in the present section. It is also plainly intimated that, in the execution of the duty here instructed to him, he must be regulated by the Word of God. He is not to act arbitrarily, but must be guided by the standard of God’s Word. In regard to one important branch of the functions here assigned to him—that which concerns synods—it is expressly declared that he is to see that “what is transacted in them be according to the mind of God”—the mind of God, as revealed in his word, being thus distinctly prescribed as a rule to him, as it is to the ordinary members of synods.* This principle was admitted by the Erastians of former times; for they conceded to their opponents “that the Christian magistrate, in ordering and disposing of ecclesiastical causes and matters of religion, is tied to keep close to the rule of the Word of God; and that as he may not assume an arbitrary government of the state, so far less of the church.§ It may be further added, that, according to our Confession, the civil magistrate is bound to act, in his official capacity, “according to the wholesome laws of each commonwealth,” section 2. Now, as our Confession of Faith is founded upon the Word of God, so it is embodied in our statute-book; and, therefore, when civil rulers assume a proper jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, which the Confession has denied to them, their proceedings must be inconsistent at once with the Word of God and the law of the land.
Keeping these remarks in view, it will not be difficult to explain, in full consistency with the liberty and independence of the church, this section of our Confession. The civil magistrate, it is declared, “hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order,” etc. This cannot mean that he is to accomplish the objects specified by all the ways in which it may be attempted; for, in the introductory clause, some of these are carefully excepted. It cannot mean that he has a rightful jurisdiction in these matters, and is entitled to judge and determine them, not only for himself, but for the regulation of the conduct of others; for this would be to usurp the keys of the kingdom of heaven. It can only imply that the matters specified are objects which he is entitled and bound to aim at, and to effect by such methods as are competent to him, without invading the jurisdiction of the church.
The Confession specifies certain means which the civil magistrate may lawfully employ for effecting the objects mentioned: “For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call synods.” From this it cannot be inferred that ministers have not a power to meet of themselves in synods and assemblies, without being called by the civil magistrate; for in chapter xxxi it is expressly declared that they have such power “of themselves, and by virtue of their office.” The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, indeed, were of opinion that, in the chapter now referred to, the Confession is not sufficiently explicit in regard to the intrinsic power of the church to call her own assemblies; and accordingly, in their act of 1647, by which the Confession was approved, they expressly declare that they understood that part of it “only of kirks not settled or constituted in point of government;” and that explanation must apply equally to the section now before us. Our Confession, then, does not assert that the magistrate may exercise this power on all occasions, and in all circumstances, or whenever there are any evils of a religious kind to correct. It is sufficient that there may be times and circumstances in which he may warrantably exercise this power. When the state of the nation as well as of the church may be convulsed, and its convulsions may be in a great degree owing to religious disorders, it is surely a high duty incumbent on him to take such a step, provided he finds it practicable and advisable. And such was the state of matters when the Westminster Assembly was convoked by the Parliament of England.
(To be continued)