By FRANCIS TURRETIN.
(Continued from p. 414.)
XXI.
It does not escape us indeed that our adversary here quibbles in various ways in order that he may avoid the force of that argument. In regard to the word justice he denies that it connotes in Scripture particularly that amending and punitive justice which we maintain, the necessity of which he does not acknowledge unless concerning the impenitent, but rather universal justice, that is, equity and rectitude which comes elsewhere under the name of purity and holiness, and according to which He does all those things which ought duly to be done, or which right and honour demand to be done, whence Lectures ch. XVI. “Nor indeed,” he said, “is there any justice in God which enjoins Him to punish sins absolutely, which He is not able to renounce; there is indeed in God perpetual justice, but this is none other than equity and rectitude.” But these propositions are brought forward by him in vain and unadvisedly. For although we do not deny that the word justice can be taken in different ways, so that either universal or particular justice may be understood, and this again may have regard to words or actions; we hold, however, that as a rule and in this matter especially it is taken to mean the constant will to avenge sins; and an inspection of the passages previously referred to will abundantly prove this. And Paul would not say, that it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble,” II. Thess. i. 6, or the Angel “that God is just and His judgments just,” because He punished sins severely, Rev. xvi. 5, 6, 7, nor David, Daniel, Nehemiah call God just on account of various penalties imposed on the faithful or profane, unless this particular justice belonged to God in a very special way, not only after the manner of an arbitrary and free act which God is at liberty to exercise or not to exercise as He wills, but in the manner of a property, of which indeed the exercise, objects and modes are managed with the utmost freedom and wisdom as are all other things by God, but which, however, is radically and fundamentally essential to God.
- Here pertain all those passages in which it is said so often that God will judge the world justly and in righteousness, in which He is said to execute judgments in accordance with His justice, as Psalm, ix. 5, and cxix. 137; Acts, xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 5, and 5, 6, etc. For these things could not be said unless this particular justice was a virtue and natural property in accordance with which His just judgment flows forth. 2. Nay, although we would grant to our adversary that Scripture understands by justice the equity and rectitude of God especially, it would detract nothing from our argument, since it would clinch it no less by this way of reasoning; for since, as the philosopher correctly taught, this justice is a universal virtue which embraces all others in itself, equity itself in fact would not be complete in all its parts without punitive justice, in as much as it would be just, nay most just, that the hatred of God against sin would be manifested in punishment, that what is due to each one might be rendered to him.
Thus if universal justice is understood, the particular is also signified, which is contained in it as a species under its kind: And, moreover, that universal justice could not be said to be perfect unless with the love of holiness there was conceived a hatred of evil and as a result of hatred the will to punish; for why would He be called just, unless because He possesses the highest rectitude and holiness, so that neither in Himself nor in His works is there anything which departs from that rectitude even in the least degree; but if He were able not to punish sin, He would be able not to hate it, if He were able not to hate it it would be possible for Him to love, and thus He would not be in the highest degree righteous. In addition there is the fact that since he acknowledges penalties and punishments of sins to be the effects of an angry judge, those effects of necessity argue a cause in Him, no cause, however, is able to be given but that punitive justice which is a part of His holiness and supreme rectitude and flowing from it, Jos. xxiv. 19; Psal. xi. 7.
XXII. Objection 2.
(1) The hatred and anger of God do not immediately infer that retributive justice is essential to God, for it can be the effect of free will, not the act of a natural property; God hates because He wills not because he is by nature obliged to do so. (2) Although hatred were natural and necessary, the necessity of punishment does not immediately follow, as in our own case there is hatred without punishment, we abhor the faults of those who injure us, but we may not, and desire not to, punish them, parents detest the faults of their children, and yet often pardon them without punishment, why might not God be equally able to hate but not to punish? (3) If God is able to punish where He does not hate He will be able to hate and not to punish; for He chastised His most holy Son whom He never hated. Answer. (1) But all these arguments are false. I say it is falsely supposed that hatred and anger are only the effect of free will and not the act of an essential property, for although it is exercised from free will it is none the less founded in an essential attribute; nay, since an act necessarily presupposes a habit, the acts of hatred and anger argues some principle, which is none other than justice itself: which is further confirmed, because it is founded in the sanctity and purity of God, whence Jos. xxiv. 19, God is said not to bear the rebellion and sins of His people because He is most holy, and Hab. i. 13, the purity of God’s eyes, He says that consummate holiness is the reason that He cannot look on evil, if He objects, holiness is natural and hatred equally. (2) Because the love of good in God is not indifferent but necessary, for as He loves Himself naturally, He is not able to love what resembles Himself.—Translated from the Latin by Rev. D. J. Macaskill, M.A.