By the late REV. WILLIAM ROMAINE.
“And Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord’s, and I will offer it up for a burnt offering” (Judges xi. 30, 31).
THIS vow has been the subject of much ridicule: it has been represented as rashly made and immorally executed, and the Scripture itself has suffered through the character of Jephthah. The vindication of it also has been attended with so much difficulties that an attempt to remove them must be of service to religion; and this I shall at present undertake. I shall endeavour to free it from the false interpretations which have been put upon it, and from objections which have been made against it. But it is not the whole history I shall treat in this manner: that would be too extensive a design for a single discourse. The principal point alone shall be now considered, namely, Jephthah’s fulfilling his vow, which I purpose to show he might, and did, fulfil without sacrificing his daughter. The history has been generally understood in this sense: when the men of Gilead had placed Jephthah at their head, in order to deliver them from the children of Ammon, he gathered his army and before he began the battle he vowed a vow unto the Lord, and promised that if God would prosper him he would sacrifice whatever should meet him on his return. Upon this he began the attack, and the Lord delivered the Ammonites into his hands, so that he slew them with very great slaughter. By this success he became obliged to a strict observance of his vow: and it unfortunately so happened that as he was returning to his house in peace his only daughter, not knowing of his vow, came out with joy to meet him. Hereby she became, according to his vow, the person to be sacrificed, and he did offer her up for a burnt-offering.
This is the common interpretation of Jephthah’s vow. It has generally been supposed that his daughter was sacrificed. An action so contrary to the law of God and man, and so inconsistent with the good character which St. Paul has given of Jephthah’s faith, that it is not easy to conceive how it came to pass that such an opinion was ever entertained at all, much less how it became so general; especially as no historical passage of Scripture has been laid more open to the wanton jests of the infidel, or is more difficult to be explained by the sober believer. From these difficulties which the history now labours under I trust I shall be able to free it by showing:—(I) That the opinion of her being sacrificed is exposed to so many solid objections that it is not defensible, and (II) By proving from the history itself that she was not sacrificed.
(a)
And the first objection against the history being explained in the common manner is this, that Jephthah couldn’t sacrifice his daughter, though he had vowed to do it, because human sacrifices were absolutely forbidden by the law of Moses. And Jephthah knew this: he did not only live in obedience to the law, but was also at that time the judge of it. And would he act contrary to his knowledge? Could he live in obedience to the law and yet dispense with the breach of one duty which Moses had made indispensable? Or what an unjust judge would he be who should undertake to punish the offence of others while he himself was a most notorious offender? These circumstances, indeed, prove rather that he ought not to have done it than that he did it not. But:
(b)
When we consider further that the same spirit of the Lord was upon Jephthah at the making of his vow as was upon Moses at the writing of the law this clearly proves that he did it not, for the Spirit of the Lord could not give one law by Moses and another opposite to it by Jephthah: He could not, while the first was still in force, direct any person to transgress it—the infallible Spirit of God cannot contradict Himself—nor can human sacrifices be both lawful and unlawful at the same time. So that if the same Spirit which spake in Moses directed Jephthah (as the text expressly says he did) in making his vow, then no doubt he did not sacrifice his daughter. But:
(c)
Further, supposing he had offered her up, and pretended to be directed by the Spirit of God, yet how came it to pass that he was never punished? To offer human sacrifice was made a capital crime by the law, and yet it is not so much as hinted that he suffered death for what he did; nay, where does it appear that he was ever called to an account for it? And yet there was something so particular in the offence, in the person of the offender, and in the time he offended, that then the Jewish state ought not to have overlooked it; and God, who then presided over it, was in equity bound to punish such an offender. And if Jephthah under these circumstances was not punished, it is at least probable that he did not deserve punishment, which yet he must have deserved, if he had sacrificed his daughter. And:
(d)
These circumstances are further confirmed from the nature of the action, which was certainly immoral, and such, therefore, Jephthah did not. There is nothing in which the general sense of mankind is more agreed than that every man’s life is his own property. This general sense arises from the natural principle of self-preservation; it comes confirmed to us by the laws of all free nations, and is further strengthened by the laws of God; and that action which should break through all these laws must be immoral. But though the action be immoral, yet perhaps it may be said, was Jephthah such a man as would not do an immoral action? St. Paul has here provided us with an answer which fully clears up the character of Jephthah in this particular: for the most considerable circumstance in the life of this eminent judge was the history before us. This was the most material action recorded of him in Scripture and which placed his character in the most conspicuous light. How St. Paul could not form a judgment of his life and character without considering this his principal transaction; and in the 11th chapter to the Hebrews, where he is celebrating the praises of those ancient worthies, who did such great and excellent acts through faith, among others he mentions Jephthah, and the time, he says, would fail if he should set about praising him, and the other worthies, as they deserved. Such a commendation from an apostle was the highest honour that could be conferred: for praise is ever judged of according to those that give it, and that is the highest praise which is given by them, who are themselves the most praiseworthy. What an high honour then was it to be commended by a St. Paul. Certainly there could be nothing immoral in the character of Jephthah whom he thus commended, and yet the principal point of view in which St. Paul considered him, that indeed which gives us the strongest proof of his faith, was the making his vow which, if he had fulfilled by sacrificing his daughter, it must be confessed was an immoral action. And, therefore, if Jephthah could not sacrifice his daughter without breaking through all those moral laws of God, and man, which say “Thou shalt not kill” and if Paul when he considered him in this light could not have recommended him had the action been immoral in fulfilling his vow, and, consequently, did not sacrifice his daughter. AND:
(e)
Besides, when he made his vow, he promised to fulfil it upon condition that God would prosper him in the undertaking he had in hand; and can it be supposed but that Jephthah would word his vow with so much caution as not to be obliged by it to do an immoral action? There are still extant proofs of his great abilities as well as faith which clearly evince that he was far from being either rash or weak, yet he must have been both to a very great degree if he could first have vowed to sacrifice his daughter or afterwards thought to do it because God had given him succession: in either of these aspects he must have acted out of character—in the first, without his usual prudence, for which he is recommended; in the latter without his faith, for which he is celebrated. But still:
(f)
Whatever Jephthah was, yet God is perfect: and how shall we vindicate the divine perfection if He gave success to those means which led directly to an immoral end? The Spirit of God was upon Jephthah when he made his vow—the hand of God enabled him to succeed—and it was this success which obliged him to perform his vow. In these instances he was under the divine guidance. And was it of God that he vowed to sacrifice his daughter, or could God in any sense be the means of such a sacrifice? These things cannot be. Far be such proceedings from the All-perfect. His goodness, justice, veracity, nay, every divine attribute forbid us to think of it. So that if the perfections of God will not suffer Him to countenance an immoral action, and if He did not countenance Jephthah’s vow by assisting him with His Holy Spirit, and by giving him success, then the thing he vowed was not immoral, and, of course, he did not sacrifice his daughter. Out of many more objections that might be urged let these suffice at present, as it fully appears from them that the account commonly given is not rational, is inconsistent to the truth of Scripture, and contrary to the history itself. Let us then seek out for some other explanation which may be fairly deduced from the words themselves: may be agreeable to the reason of the thing, and consistent with the good character Paul has given us of Jephthah; and such an interpretation I shall first lay down, and afterwards endeavour to establish in order to:
II. Prove from the history itself that he did not sacrifice his daughter.
The matter of fact was this: when the children of Israel were in great distress by the invasion of the Ammonites, and had no captain who might lead them out to battle, the Lord raised up Jephthah to be their deliverer and, as it was common in such cases during the era of the judges, the Spirit of the Lord came upon him to enable him to execute his office. And when he entered upon it, he made a vow unto the Lord “that upon condition of success, whatever should meet him at his door when he returned in peace should EITHER be the Lord’s OR offered up for a burnt-offering.” This was the vow! And if it consists of two distinct sentences, as I shall presently show it does, then Jephthah will be found to have worded it with so much caution that he lay under no obligation to sacrifice his daughter. When he returned and met his only child, the history represents him under great perplexity; but this did not arise from his concern to offer her up: there were other reasons. The text itself tells us that it was losing all hopes of descendants, losing the inheritance which, in default of heirs, went to the nearest kinsman, and many other privileges which then subsisted among the Jews, but have now ceased among us, that occasioned his grief, for we find “That she went with her companions and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains. And it came to pass at the end of two months that she returned unto her father, who did with her ACCORDING TO HIS VOW WHICH HE HAD VOWED,” i.e., to the first part of the vow: he dedicated her unto the Lord. And in consequence of such dedication she continued the remainder of her life a virgin for after the vow had been fulfilled the text observes, “She knew no man.” Hereby the purpose of the vow was answered. From the time she was dedicated unto the Lord she continued to the end of her days in an unmarried state, because as the vow happened to fall upon her while she was in that state she could not change it without causing her father to break his vow. This was the fact: whether it can be justified or not is another question which no ways concern my present argument. It is sufficient for my present purpose that the text clearly asserts she was, according to the words of the vow, to be dedicated to the Lord—was dedicated—at the time of the dedication was a virgin—continued for some years afterwards—and therefore continued so till her death. This was indeed a singular case: the design of it was so uncommon, the reason to justify it so extraordinary, that no precedents can be drawn from hence for recluses of any kind. It might easily be shown to be a confutation rather of such practices if that were with the design of my present argument. But I wive this and proceed to observe that it was in her so remarkable an instance of filial piety, so evident a proof of her public-spiritedness, and love of her country; and these virtues were in her so eminent, in her condition so illustrious, that the nation, in gratitude to her, made it a law, so long as she lived, “for the daughters of Israel to go yearly to MAKE PRESENTS to the daughter of Jephthah four times in the year.” And here certainly I need not point out the absurdity of going year after year to make presents to a dead person, though the propriety of making them to one in her state must be manifest to everyone. This is the true interpretation of the history; and it is free from all the objections to which the common opinion is exposed. It only remains that I support it by sound arguments; and the following, I trust, will appear to everyone satisfactory. And:
(a)
The first is taken from the history not mentioning not being sacrificed; and when the history is thus silent, from whence can it be proved that she was sacrificed? If there be any proof it must be either in the words of the vow or in the fulfilling of it, but there is no proof in them, for there is nothing more said in the latter than that “he did to her ACCORDING TO HIS VOW,” so that here we are referred to the words of the vow, to know what it was he did to her; and all that Jephthah vowed was: “If the Lord would give him success, whatever met him on his return in peace, should either be the Lord’s, or he would offer it up for a burnt-offering.” Here it is plain what he promised in these words consist in two parts: for what met him and was to be dedicated to the Lord, was one thing, but what met him and was to be sacrificed was another; and it is certain these two things are distinct. Though everything sacrificed was dedicated to the Lord, yet everything dedicated to the Lord was not sacrificed. The incense—aromatics—vestments—and all the apparatus of the temple were dedicated to the Lord, but yet none of them were sacrificed. The vow then consists of two senses, which means two different things, and which do not follow in consequence—whatever meets me shall be the Lord’s, “and I will sacrifice it,” but the true construction is, “It shall be the Lord’s or I will sacrifice it”; for the particle used in the original has the sense of “or,” and the translators have so often rendered it thus, and have mentioned it even here in the margin of the Bible, that no one can object to its being so interpreted in this place, where the whole history fixes it to this sense. As the vow then consists of two distinct parts, it would be kept by observing either of them, and one thing Jephthah promised mentions nothing about sacrificing his daughter—and as when he fulfilled what he promised, it is only said, “did to her according to his vow,” then it is evident that the history is quite silent about her being sacrificed; which as clearly proves as any negative argument can, that she was not sacrificed. But:
(b)
This is still further evident from hence that though Jephthah had vowed to sacrifice whatever creature should first meet him, yet if a creature had met him which the law forbade to be offered up, it is certain he could not have offered it; and then how could he offer his daughter? If an unclean creature had first met him, would he have thought himself obliged by his vow to offer it up, when God had forbidden it? Certainly he would not. No vow can lay a man under any obligation to transgress the laws of God. What, then, was to be done in this case? The law itself had provided a remedy. As the unclean creature could not be sacrificed, it was to be ransomed, and another allowed for sacrifice was to be offered up in its stead; and why ought not this rule to take place in the case of Jephthah? The same law which forbade offering up an unclean creature forbade human sacrifice. If a vow should fall upon an unclean creature, it was to be ransomed—if it should fall upon a human creature it was also to be ransomed, and God promised to accept of one in place of the other. As I lay great stress upon this argument, and would have it carefully considered, I must refer to the 27th chapter of Leviticus, where this point is fully treated of. Now Jephthah must have read this chapter. He could not but know that this was the rule prescribed in the law of Moses, and therefore, though he had vowed to sacrifice whatever creature should first meet him, yet he was not obliged by his vow to sacrifice his daughter: because by the law she was to be ransomed; and this eminent judge could not be ignorant that it was lawful to ransom her, and absolutely not to do it. So that, put the case either way, the point is clear; either her father did include her in his vow or he did not—if he did, then she was to be ransomed—and if he did not, then she could not be sacrificed. And therefore this is another strong negative argument that she was not made a burnt-offering.
(c)
The evidence does not rest here. There are other arguments which clearly prove that she was alive after her father had fulfilled his vow, and therefore, of course, she could not be sacrificed; for the sacred historian observes, as a consequence of the vow’s being fulfilled—as what followed upon her entering into it, that she continued a virgin all the rest of her life. “Her father did with her according to his vow: AND SHE KNEW NO MAN.” But when? After she was sacrificed? No. This remark would have been absurd when she was dead, whereas being a description of her after the vow was fulfilled, it must describe some state or condition she was in, even after the completion of the vow and in consequence of it—and this was her beginning or continuing afterwards a virgin. Jephthah, as I have observed, was not obliged by his vow to sacrifice her—his vow would be kept by dedicating her to the Lord. He did dedicate her. After she was dedicated the sacred historian remarks that she remained a virgin. Can anything be more plain or self-evident than that she, who remained a virgin, was also alive? Could she with any propriety be said to be the one without being the other? Nay, if he had written purposely to prove her alive, could he have brought any stronger proof than this—”that from the day of her dedication she continued a virgin.” This, therefore, I look upon as a positive argument, taken from the history itself, for her not being sacrificed.
(d)
The history proceeds further, and asserts that she was alive at least some years after the vow was fulfilled. The words are—”And it was a LAW in Israel that the daughters of Israel went yearly (to lament as it is rendered or as it is in the original) to make presents to the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite four days in the year.” When the daughters of Israel went according to the laws of the land four days in the year to visit her she must be alive. The intention of making them proves as much. So does the setting apart four days in a year to make them. The very thing speaks itself—she who received these presents therefore was not dead; and, besides, by the law of Moses it was a crime, if she had been dead, and yet no censure is passed upon it. Therefore she was living. And when these circumstances are considered together, what further evidence would any person require than this? That she could not be dead who was visited four days every year by the daughters of Israel and had then such presents made her as none could receive, but one who was living.
(e)
And what greatly strengthens these arguments, what demonstrates that she was alive long after the vow was fulfilled, is the proof taken from the sacred historians observing “that she RECEIVED these presents.” Four days in every year the daughters of Israel made their presents to the daughter of Jephthah”—they made them for her use and benefit; the particle used in the original does not only denote that one was the cause of the other and produced whatever action or condition the writer was treating of in this sense it is most elegantly used in the first chapter of Genesis. When spoken of persons, where one is doing something for another, it often denotes that one did the action for the use and benefit of the other. This is a well-known idiom of the sacred tongue; and the literal sense of the word, as well as the scope of the history, require that in the passage before us it should be thus understood. The phrase, therefore, expresses that the daughters of Israel made their presents “for the use and benefit of Jephthah’s daughter.” For the use of one who was sacrificed? For the benefit of one who was dead? Certainly there can be no greater absurdity. The dead are out of the reach of our good offices, but she shared in them—she received them—presents were made to her, therefore she must have received them—they were made for her use and benefit, therefore she was sensible of them for some years after the vow was fulfilled, therefore was for some years after alive, and, of course, not sacrificed. If this argument required anything to add to its clearness and conviction, I might support it by other authorities; but it seems to me undeniably conclusive. I shall only mention by way of illustration two historical passages by heathen writers, in the grand lineaments of which there is so great resemblance of the present history, that I doubt not they took their origin from hence: I mean the vows of Agamemnon and Idomeneus. Their case were almost the same as Jephthah’s. A parallel might be easily drawn between them to show this; and if cannot be proved (with some degree of probability I think it might) that both of them took their rise from this history it would strengthen the interpretation I have now given of it, because if these were borrowed from it, and tradition had preserved perfect the chief marks of the likeness, this would be a probable reason that Jephthah’s daughter was not sacrificed. Neither of their daughters were offered up, though they were in parallel circumstances with his, and it is likely the tradition of her being saved was the foundation of their histories being so represented. What tends strongly to confirm the opinion that these histories were derived from Jephthah’s vow is an instance of the same sort of presents being offered to certain recluses in the heathen world, and it will be very difficult to assign any satisfactory reasons for the origin of such a ceremony unless we trace up to the days of Jephthah. It was in all appearance a corruption of his history. Men retain the knowledge of the fact, after they have forgot the reasons upon which he acted, and this led them to ingraft upon it numerous errors. The practice of dedicating recluses without any obligation or necessity must, I think, have had its origin from hence. It took its rise from a gross mistake of this history. It could not come to the heathen world from reason—it was unreasonable: not from nature—it was unnatural: there must have been some authority which at first seemed to countenance such a practice; and by length of time, and the corruption of mankind, the case might be so much mistaken, as to be made a precedent for that very error, of which it is most clear confutation. Now if this custom among the heathen came from Jephthah, it will greatly establish the interpretation of the text. This it will prove at least, that they who are dedicated were indisputably alive. The heathen made the same presents to their recluses, as the daughters of Israel did in the case before us. This is abundantly evident from their own writers. And for what reason should they thus agree in this ceremony unless it had been derived from one common cause? And so far as this is probable, it must be admitted that if the heathen offered these presents to none but to them who were alive, than she who received the same presents were also alive.
I might have been more copious upon these arguments, but they seem to me so plain and conclusive that they need not be further insisted on: and now the case has been fairly stated, I leave it to every impartial man to determine on which side the truth prevails. The common received opinion is that Jephthah, according to his vow, sacrificed his daughter, but this opinion I showed was not defensible; because human sacrifice was forbidden by the law of Moses, and Jephthah did not transgress this law, for he was directed by the Spirit of God in making his vow—he was never punished for it—and he is commended for it by Paul (rather by the Holy Spirit) and had success in consequence of it. And if the common opinion cannot be supported by these objections, much less against the arguments brought to prove that she was not sacrificed—the historian has neither included her in the vow, nor in the fulfilling of it—and if she had been included, the law had provided a ransom whereby the vow would be kept and she not made a burnt-offering. From these negative arguments I endeavoured to establish the true interpretation, which was settled beyond doubt from certain passages in the history which gave her the attributes of a living person some years after her father had fulfilled his vow; and I think that no truth can be more evident than this, that she could not be sacrificed and dead who still had the attributes of a living person.
Thus is the character of Jephthah vindicated, and neither rashness nor immorality entered into the making of his vow or the fulfilling of it, but this eminent judge appears to be distinguished for his faith and other virtues. The Scripture also is clear in this particular, and reconciled to reason and common sense; and this historical passage was recorded, as all Scripture was, that the man of God might be perfect, thoroughly furnished to every good work.