The Scriptural Bounds of Liberty of Conscience

Rev. D. M. Boyd

(The first half of this article, extracts from a paper given at the Theological Conference in December 1989, dealt with Conscience; Liberty of Conscience; and The Bounds upon Liberty of Conscience.)

The Place of the Regulative Principle with respect to Liberty of Conscience.

The Regulative Principle is an important principle for the Church of God. It is that principle which requires the Church to regulate all the affairs of Christ’s kingdom by, and according to, the Word of God; or, in other words, it is the principle which recognises “the regulative authority of the Scriptures” in the kingdom of Christ. I shall assume familiarity with the outworkings of this principle and move rapidly on to its practical importance.

It is not merely a principle that the Most High has revealed in Scripture for the Church of God to live by, but it has a very practical purpose. This purpose is to accommodate tender conscience in the Church.¹⁶

It operates like this. If the Church of God is to admit of nothing but which can be shown to be based upon Scripture or by good and necessary inference to be derived from Scripture, then no-one can object to being involved in such worship. However, as soon as something is introduced which is beside Scripture, conscience can become offended and the Church of God will be divided. So the Regulative Principle is that Principle which ensures the unity of the Church in its worship by disarming conscientious objection to the form of worship.

Therefore the Regulative Principle brings liberty to the Church of God by safeguarding liberty of conscience. When new ideas on worship were introduced in the 19th century into Scotland, they were introduced by overturning the Regulative Principle. For example, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, in introducing instrumental music in 1872, stated, “The Synod, in relaxing a rule which has never been made to rest on an avowed principle, could lay down no principle for dispensing with uniformity in practice, except the principle of religious liberty in matters not subject of direct Scriptural command; and in deciding that uniformity of practice in the mode of leading the service of praise is not imperative, the Synod does more to sustain its own authority than it could do by the continuance of a rule which has not been enforced.” (my italics). The United Presbyterian Church was ruling that Synodical authority should prevail over the Regulative Principle.
16. A fuller treatment of the Regulative Principle is to be found in The Regulative Principle — its Scope and Application, a lecture given to the Society for Biblical Standards, London, in October 1990, available on tape but due for publication in 1991, D.V.

The Regulative Principle operates in the sphere of Church government as well as in the sphere of worship. As far as ecclesiastical power is concerned, a contemporary Professor has attacked our church for allowing, so he thinks, our Synod to develop a form of papalism with its encyclicals. He must know that what he is attacking is nothing more than the normal exercise of ecclesiastical power as historic Presbyterianism has understood it. Other churches have resiled from the true position because of the secular understanding of liberty of conscience invading the church.

It is a lawful exercise of church power to determine from the Scripture what is its doctrine and what is acceptable Christian practice. The former leads to Creeds and Confessions; the latter is at a premium nowadays. However, as one is legitimate, so is the other. The cleavage between doctrine and practice is continuing apace in our day, and it is one of the principles of the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland that doctrine and practice must conform with each other.

The APC idea of liberty of conscience is not consistent with that of the Westminster Confession of Faith and goes against the Regulative Principle.

Two preliminary points may be made. Firstly, we must remind ourselves that the Associated Presbyterian Churches (APC) have given no clear statement of their understanding of liberty of conscience and how it applies to the present situation. This makes it difficult to ascertain their real views. They have made some dogmatic assertions but given no explanations. A gloss of their view may be that they say that they are escaping from a popish tyranny over liberty of conscience. Such a statement is unhelpful, and we may as vigorously assert that we are fighting for Christian liberty. We are holding to Galatians 5: 1: “Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage”. We will not countenance the idolatrous worship of Rome.

Secondly, I give it as my personal opinion that the APC conscience has not been wounded by recent Synod decisions. Their conscience managed to live with these for long enough, for they tell us that our troubles go back to the 1970s, so demonstrating that they have an elastic conscience which can stretch quite far. But I consider that people whose consciences will allow them to attend idolatrous worship and identify with the idolaters engaged in their idolatry are people whose consciences are very much asleep. (Note that this is not to accuse them of idolatry, which has been a common mistake, but rather it is to accuse them of countenancing idolatry). Therefore, I do not consider their schism to arise from conscience; the reason must be sought elsewhere.²⁰

Let us remind ourselves that the Westminster Confession of Faith is a Puritan document and the conscience that they have described is a Christian conscience, or what we might call a Puritan conscience. The scriptural rationale behind chapter 20, section 2, is that they did not want their consciences to be imposed upon and they wanted to be able to worship God purely. It is a conscientious concern to worship God in a manner that does not offend their consciences.

Contrast with this, the INVERSION of this argument by the APC. They want liberty to attend the very type of worship which the Puritans were abominating! The Puritans were pleading liberty of conscience against imposing abominable worship; the APC plead liberty of conscience to be allowed to go to abominable worship. The Puritans were pleading liberty of conscience to prevent abominable practices being imposed upon them in worship, while the APC are pleading liberty of conscience to attend voluntarily abominable practices in worship. The APC conscience is not a conscience which is fending off imposition of idolatry and ceremonies, for which purpose the Regulative Principle and liberty of conscience exist. Their conscience is not the same as the Puritan conscience, the Christian conscience of the Westminster Divines.²¹

The APC liberty of conscience is therefore NOT the Puritan liberty of conscience; it does not relate to the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter 20, section 2, at all.

The source of the modern idea of liberty and religious toleration.

I shall now try to trace the origin of the modern view of liberty of conscience. When ordinary APC members plead liberty of conscience, I do not know what they mean. It sounds so like the secular view that I can only assume that they have been drinking so long at the fountain of the mass media²² that they cannot tell the difference between fresh water and stale. People use liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment interchangeably and employ them as shibboleths rather than as meaningful concepts. It sounds as if they are speaking about liberty rather than liberty of conscience.

The right of private judgment seems to them to be the liberty to think, possibly to act, according to whatever they think the scripture says. It sounds right, it sounds just, but it is simply the religious equivalent of the secular views on liberty.

I think we must go to Voltaire to find our explanation for this secular view in our modern world.²³ Voltaire made vehement attacks on religious persecution. He came to hold views on rights, liberties and religious toleration which have become axiomatic today; at least they are often quoted.²⁴ He believed one should have the right to believe and to say whatsoever one wanted. This can be seen to be against all that I have said so far, but it was developed in the context of restraining intolerance, particularly religious intolerance. It was developed to restrain the persecuting spirit. He was not the first to speak or write like this, but his influence was felt.

This is, therefore, the world’s method for restraining the passions of men. This method is to propound Voltaire’s doctrine, which is encapsulated in that often quoted statement that is attributed to him — “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” (atrr. in S. G. Tallentyre, The Friends of Voltaire (1907) p199). I doubt that he would defend to the death their right to say it, and he would certainly disapprove of what I have to say, which is, that the sentiment is completely wrong to the Christian conscience. Yet how often does one hear people repeating this sentiment? For example, in the recent Salman Rushdie affair, how often do we hear these sentiments on radio programmes in an attempt to restrain Muslim passion from breaking out into violence? It is woven into the warp and woof of our society, so that to it may be attributed the sentiment behind such expressions as “You are entitled to your opinion” (Does God say so?), “We will have to agree to differ” (Does God allow us this option?).²⁵ Why has such a sentiment gained such a hold upon the public mind? I believe it is because this is the world’s way of restraining the angry passions of man.²⁶ His being made tolerant of error or differences causes his violent passions to subside. However, the Christian way is better still; along with the Christian’s intolerance of error is the restraint upon violence that is central to the Christian ethic. He does not need such tolerant doctrines to prevent violent intolerance. So, yet again, true Christianity is lumbered with the results of the persecuting intolerance of the mainline, dominant, persecuting religions, against which Voltaire fulminated. Instead, we preach law, gospel, and the grace of God to restrain man’s wickedness, and the love of Christ to constrain him to the love of others, as the method to prevent persecution.

Therefore, the Christian Church cannot admit the right of other faiths to believe as they do, nor the right to say what they say, nor the right to do as they do; but this is held in conjunction with non-persecution of other faiths. The Christian Church is not alone in denying such things. The State denies it also in certain areas which are considered to undermine the security or morality of the nation. For example, to uphold the principles of justice, a witness swears to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. He is denied the right to say as he pleases, and will be punished for perjury if he tries to take Voltaire with him into the witness box. Another example: paedophiles have no right to spread and practice their nefarious beliefs.

The Free Presbyterian Church has not yet capitulated to the views on liberty of conscience that prevail even in the ecclesiastical scene; so this makes us the odd-man-out in present-day Presbyterianism. Some may feel rather embarrassed at being the odd-man-out and take this as a sure sign that we must be wrong. Rather, it demonstrates that the secular views on liberty of conscience have invaded the Presbyterian world to an alarming extent, and this leads us to consider the final section of this paper.

The on-going challenge to the whole Christian community in the field of ideas.

The challenge that faces the Christian Church is to alert others to these insidious views of liberty, to guard ourselves against them, but, especially, to state the Christian response to the multi-faith situation when other faiths assert the civil right given to them to practise their false religions.

Religious Toleration is the real subject. As far as the Christian Church is concerned it has been debated since the Reformation. Some bounds have been clearly drawn, and some foundational matters have been largely agreed upon by the Christian community.

At the religious level, we are quite clear that idolatry is wrong. It is vain for a person to plead liberty of conscience to re-examine the question. At the moral level, personal violence is considered wrong. These foundational matters of conscience have been resolved by the application of many minds over many years to the question. The right of private judgment must be allowed to people to examine the question anew for themselves, but it is vain for them to say to the Christian community at the end of their examination, “I wish to plead liberty of conscience to worship idols and to kill my neighbour.”

There are other matters in our modern society which are taken for granted as a matter of liberty, but whether these can be legitimately pled on the principle of liberty of conscience is questionable. For example, we have all heard of the right of freedom of speech. However, the Christian community would modify that right to the freedom to speak the truth. We have no freedom under God’s law to speak lies, and sometimes under human laws we deny the right (e.g. we swear-in witnesses to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth — not to do so will be treated as perjury). Under God’s law we have no right to speak blasphemy, curses or insults. This is because they are judged wrong by conscience applying God’s law to these matters. To plead liberty of conscience would, therefore, be nonsense, as the only liberty conscience has is to do that which is right.

In the area of freedom of thought we come even more into conflict with the prevailing views of the present era.²⁷ The Scripture is clear that man is wrong in his thoughts, which rebel against God. But the prevailing view of society is that a man’s thoughts are his own, and that he should be allowed to have them as long as he does no-one any harm by them. There has been a long history of the suppression of thought, to the shame of the suppressors, so much so that modern man thinks he must have liberty to think whatever thoughts he wishes. George Orwell has given the matter concrete form in Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which he describes the Thought Police in totalitarian regimes. I think he had Roman Catholicism in mind, just as much as communism, for a central character is called O’Brien.

Donald R. Kelley in The Beginning of Ideology²⁸ suggests that demands for liberty of conscience are the first stage of a new ideology. He tries to identify the stages in the development of ideology, which need not concern us here, but I emphasise that demands for liberty of conscience are but the first stage of a new ideology.

It was so at the Reformation. It was so at the time of the French Revolution, which ushered in a century given over to the new ideas of liberty and which so affected Church life that, in the 19th century Scottish Church scene, liberty of conscience was the mainstay of the method of introducing the new theology.

Rev. Fergus Ferguson was the man who occasioned the introduction of the first Declaratory Act into the Scottish and worldwide Presbyterian scene, in the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland. In 1871, Ferguson was challenged as to his orthodoxy and he was asked to subscribe four propositions to satisfy a Committee of the Synod of the U.P. Church. Reluctantly he subscribed these propositions, while understanding “that my liberty, as a minister of the gospel, to speak according to my own light, conscience, and sense of responsibility, remains unimpaired.”²⁹ That liberty was explained by Dr James Brown at a latter date, after Ferguson’s heresy trial in 1878, as: “… liberty on matters which do not enter into the substance of that faith,”³⁰ a phrase which was to gain notoriety in subsequent Declaratory Acts. In his heresy trial Ferguson defended himself on liberty of conscience. In one of his speeches, he referred to “the light of God’s Word, and the light of those equally divine gifts of reason and conscience which God has given to men.” He defiantly stated: “I hold that it is the height of intolerance and spiritual tyranny to say that a man ought to be severely punished by any body of his fellow-men for his religious opinions, whatever they may be, and I hold it is persecution to go on to the infliction of such punishment.”³¹

Ferguson was a pioneer of the theological revision that was to introduce the Declaratory Act era and he, like the APC, appealed “from the subordinate standards to the Word of God”³² although, in his case, it was motivated by a fierce opposition to the Westminster Confession of Faith³³; compare the Deed of Separation, 1989, of the APC, which states, concerning the subordinate standards, “insofar as each and every one of these documents is consistent with the Holy Scriptures.” Dr Samuel Miller says of this latter phraseology in 1833: “This, I acknowledge, appears to me a subterfuge which offers as direct an insult to common sense as it does to common honesty. Upon this principle it is plain that any man might, without scruple, subscribe any confession of faith whatsoever. For, surely a Socinian might, without the least hesitation, declare that he believed a rigidly Calvinistic Confession, so far as he considered it as coinciding with the word of God.”³⁴ Rev. James S. Sinclair wrote similarly: “Notice its terms: ‘The Confession of Faith is to be regarded as an infallible standard of faith and worship only in so far as it accords with the Holy Scripture, interpreted by the Holy Spirit,’ . . . it is quite apparent that this new declaration approved by the Assembly . . . is just a Declaratory Act of a very dangerous character though it does not bear the name. . .”³⁵

In the secular world there is much speculation about the death of ideology. D. R. Kelley finishes his book with a chapter on “The End of Ideology.” This may simply reflect the current stage of libertarian thought. However, as long as there is resistance to libertarian free-will, there will be pleas for liberty of conscience as the springboard to develop new ideologies to liberate mankind from the bondage of the current thinking. Yet it is almost axiomatic, “There are none so intolerant as the liberals!”

Christ has promised to be with His Church; the gates of hell will not prevail against it. We may therefore expect Him to raise up a standard against satanic assaults. However, we are to attend to His revealed will in Scripture and to seek to satisfy the conditions that He imposes upon such a divine intervention. “I will yet for this be enquired of by the house of Israel, to do it for them.” Ezek. 36: 37. So let us pray to Him for this blessing, rather than sink down in despondency under the current onslaught of materialism and agnosticism. Let us not take the line of least resistance which, in things spiritual, is nothing short of Laodicean indifference. There is worldly wisdom in going with the stream; but its wisdom is in finding the favour and applause of the world; it will not find the favour of God. “How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?” John 5: 44. Let us rather look to the grace and strength of Him who is the Rock of ages, in whom is everlasting strength.

The APC have left us on the plea of liberty of conscience. It remains to be seen what ideology it is that they represent, and which they think could not find expression for itself within the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland.³⁶

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Footnotes for “The Scriptural Bounds of Liberty of Conscience”:

1. A fuller treatment of the Regulative Principle is to be found in The Regulative Principle — its Scope and Application, a lecture given to the Society for Biblical Standards, London, in October 1990, available on tape but due for publication in 1991, D.V.
2. The Soul of a Scottish Church, David Woodside, Glasgow 1918, p201. The Relief Church introduced hymns in 1792. It would be helpful to read Calvin’s views on liberty in the 1536 edition of the Institutes, Chapter 6, “Christian Freedom, Ecclesiastical Power and Political Administration” (for in the normative 5th edition this chapter has been broken up) to understand how Calvin puts liberty along with the Regulative Principle.
3. The Barrier Act had as its purpose the prevention of sudden innovation, but also it had a regard to liberty of conscience in the department of legislation.
4. e.g. Bannerman, Vol. 1, pp169, 345-348. The Free Presbyterian Magazine, Vol 41, pp419-421.
5. The Synod Statement of May 1990 says, with respect to the APC claim to conscientious scruples and their continued occupancy of Free Presbyterian property, “… the profession of the APC to have very tender consciences is belied by their conduct.”
6. Contrast the APC permission to attend Roman mass voluntarily with the famous incident concerning Janet Geddes throwing her stool at the Dean of Edinburgh’s head as he began to read the new liturgy, crying out “Villain, dost thou say mass at my lug!” Sketches of Church History, Thomas M’Crie, 4th edition, Vol. 1, p204. The Story of the Scottish Church Thomas M’Crie, 1874, reprinted by Free Presbyterian Publications, 1988, p141. Contrast it, also, with the conduct of Queen Elizabeth I who walked out of the Christmas Day mass as soon as the reading of the Gospel was concluded, and before the elevation of the host. She repeated this performance at her Coronation service a month later. The Reign of Elizabeth 1558-1603, J. B. Black, 2nd edition, 1959, 1988, pp9-10.
7. The mass media is not the only source of the secular views on liberty, but, in the context, it is the source most likely to have affected the people of the APC, as well as others. Some APC members will have been influenced by other sources also.
8. Voltaire, (François-Marie Arouet, 1694-1778), is not the source but the populariser, of these views. For the post-mediaeval source we must go back to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and their respective theories of the Social Contract.
9. “This small, brilliant book (Lettres philosophiques, Voltaire, 1734) is a landmark in the history of thought; not only does it embody the philosophy of the 18th century, but it also defines the essential direction of the modern mind.” Article, Voltaire, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1979, René Henry Pomeau.
10. This is not the same as Cromwell’s “I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken.” (letter to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 3 August 1650).
11. “It was to counteract such instinctive urges to violence disguised as religious fervor that some ‘Politiques’ presented a counsel of moderation.” The Beginning of Ideology, Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation, Donald R. Kelley, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p332.
12. The Free Presbyterian Magazine, Vol. 41, p448; The Practical Philosophy, R. L. Dabney, pp303-317.
13. The Beginning of Ideology, Consciousness and Society in the French Reformation, Donald R. Kelley, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
14. Fergus Ferguson, His Theology and Heresy Trial, J. H. Leckie, Edinburgh, 1923, p79.
15. ibid, p271.
16. ibid, pp126, 213.
17. ibid, p106.
18. ibid, p217.
19. Doctrinal Integrity: On the Utility and Importance of Creeds and Confessions and Adherence to Our Doctrinal Standards, Samuel Miller, Presbyterian Heritage Publications, Dallas, 1989, p85; also Letter VI in Letters to Presbyterians on the Present Crisis in the Presbyterian Church in the United States, Samuel Miller, Philadelphia, 1833; and The Presbyterian Magazine, 1833.
20. The Free Presbyterian Magazine, 1903, Vol 8, p104. For further discussion of this type of subscriptional subterfuge see The Erosion of Calvinistic Orthodoxy: Seceders and Subscription in Scottish Presbyterianism, Ian Hamilton, Rutherford House Books, Edinburgh, 1990, pp19-20.
21. Notice, also, Thomas M’Crie’s statement: “(Liberty of conscience) was revived by the Dissenters in England and Ireland near the beginning of the late century, who employed the most favoured topics of modern declamation as to dictating to consciences, depriving men of the right of private judgment, &c . . . in pleading exemption from human tests of orthodoxy, and the restraints of church authority with respect to opinions which they judged agreeable to scripture. In our own time we have abundant evidence of a similar operation of the same principle.” Statement of Difference, Thomas M’Crie, 1871, p166.